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Abstract. Similar to Arrow’s impossibility theorem for preference ag-
gregation, judgment aggregation has also an intrinsic impossibility for
generating consistent group judgment from individual judgments. Re-
moving some of the pre-assumed conditions would mitigate the prob-
lem but may still lead to too restrictive solutions. It was proved that
if completeness is removed but other plausible conditions are kept, the
only possible aggregation functions are oligarchic, which means that the
group judgment is purely determined by a certain subset of participating
judges. Instead of further challenging the other conditions, this paper in-
vestigates how the judgment from each individual judge affects the group
judgment in an oligarchic environment. We explore a set of intuitively
demanded conditions under abstentions and design a feasible judgment
aggregation rule based on the agents’ hierarchy. We show this proposed
aggregation rule satisfies the desirable conditions. More importantly, this
rule is oligarchic with respect to a subset of agenda instead of the whole
agenda due to its literal-based characteristics.
1 Introduction
Judgment aggregation is an interdisciplinary research topic in economics, philos-
ophy, political science, law and recently in computer science [1–5]. It deals with
the problem of how a group judgment on certain issues, represented in logical
propositions, can be formed based on individuals’ judgments on the same issues.
Although most of voting rules for social choice, such as majority, two-thirds
majority or unanimity, are applicable to judgment aggregation, their behaviour
can be significantly different due to possible logical links among the proposi-
tions on which a collective decision has to be made. A well-known example is
the so-called doctrinal paradox [6], which shows that the majority rule fails to
guarantee consistent group judgments.
Suppose a court consisting of three judges has to reach a verdict in a breach-
of-contract case. There are three propositions on which the court is required to
make judgments:
p: The defendant was contractually obliged not to do a particular action.
q: The defendant did that action.
r: The defendant is liable for breach of contract.
According to legal doctrine, propositions p and q are jointly necessary and suf-
ficient for proposition r, that is p ∧ q ↔ r. Now the three judges’ judgments on
the propositions are showed in Table 1.
Table 1. A doctrinal paradox
p q r
Judge 1 T T T
Judge 2 T F F
Judge 3 F T F
Maj T T F
If the three judges take a majority vote on proposition r which is regarded
as the conclusion, the outcome is its rejection: a ‘not liable’ verdict. But if they
take majority votes on each of p and q instead, then p and q are accepted and
hence by the legal doctrine, r should be accepted as well: a ‘liable’ verdict. This
specifically displays that the set of propositions {p, q,¬r} which is accepted by a
majority is logically inconsistent relative to the constraint p∧q ↔ r. The problem
generalizes well beyond this example and does not depend on the presence of
any legal doctrine or exogenous constraints [7].
To illustrate a more general problem, consider any set of propositions with
logical connections. Suppose a three-member committee has to make group judg-
ments (acceptance/rejection) on three logically interconnected propositions:
p: We can afford a budget deficit.
p → q: If we can afford a budget deficit, then we should spend more
money on education.
q: We should spend more money on education.
The individual judgments on given propositions for each member are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2. A discursive dilemma
p p→ q q
1 T T T
2 T F F
3 F T F
Maj T T F
Then each individual holds consistent judgments on the three propositions,
and yet there are majorities for p, p → q and ¬q, a logically inconsistent set
of propositions. The first is the demand that in aggregating judgment a group
should be responsive to the views of members on each of judgments involved.
The second is the demand that in aggregating judgment a group should reach a
collective set of judgments that is itself rational. The paradox shows that the two
demands are sometimes in conflict, so that a group that tries to aggregate judg-
ment faces a dilemma. The fact that majority voting may generate inconsistent
group judgments is called the discursive dilemma [3, 8, 9].
Naturally, the observation that majority voting may fail to produce consistent
group judgments raises several questions. In particular, there are two fundamen-
tal questions: First, how general is the problem? Is it restricted to majority
voting, or does it extend to other decision methods? Secondly, does it occur only
in special situations, such as the breach-of-contract case, or does it arise more
generally?
In response to these questions, a growing literature on the impossibility of con-
sistent judgment aggregation under various conditions springs up. List and Pet-
tit showed an impossibility result, similar to Arrow’s impossibility theorem [10],
that no aggregation rule can generate consistent group judgments if we require
the rule to satisfy a set of “plausible” conditions [11]. However, such an impos-
sibility result did not discourage the investigation of the possibility of judgment
aggregation. None of the conditions on either aggregation rules or decision prob-
lems, is indefectible. By weakening or varying these conditions, a growing body
of literature on judgment aggregation has emerged in recent years [12–16].
Among all the plausible conditions that lead to impossibility results on judg-
ment aggregation, completeness as one of the rationality requirements has re-
ceived criticism of being overly demanding in many real-world situations, where
an individual may abstain on a decision issue, and the group judgment on some
issue may be undetermined. In fact, if we give up completeness, we are able
to circumvent impossibility [11, 17–20]. Among them, Ga¨rdenfors has proved a
representation theorem for judgment aggregation without completeness, which
shows that under certain fairly natural conditions, the only possible aggregation
rules are oligarchic. Dietrich and List (2008) have strengthened Ga¨rdenfors’ re-
sults and showed that by giving up completeness in favor of deductive closure,
oligarchies instead of dictatorships are obtained. However, this by no means is a
negative result. In fact, our previous work [21] demonstrates that with absten-
tions, oligarchic aggregation is no longer a single level determination but can
also be a multiple-level democracy, which partially explains its pervasiveness in
the real world.
Since in our society the hierarchy is one of the most basic organization forms
and a hierarchical group may give individual members or subgroups the priority
to determine the group judgments on certain propositions. However, such kind
of expert rights has been rarely investigated in the current literature [22], let
alone proposing a specific judgment aggregation rule to formally display how
the hierarchical groups generate the group judgments. In [21] we deal with this
issue by proposing a quasi-lexicographic judgment aggregation rule which works
well over the limited agenda. It mainly focuses on the following two questions:
How does the hierarchical group generate the group judgments? How can the
non-oligarchs have the power to make the collective decision in an oligarchic
environment?
In this paper, we continue this line of research and investigate the question
of whether we can generate consistent group judgments when giving different
agents different weights depending on their hierarchy on the propositions in
question. We focus on judgment aggregation with abstentions under voter’s hi-
erarchy. Our contributions can be summarized in the following: First, we amend
the“plausible” conditions in [21], which allows us to extend the set of proposi-
tions on which the quasi-lexicographic rule works well from a set of literals to
logically interconnected formulas; Secondly, we propose a feasible literal-based
aggregation rule for judgment aggregation with abstentions under voter’s hier-
archy, and show that it is neither dictatorial nor oligarchic over the whole set
of agenda; Last but not least, to some extent, we circumvent the impossibility
result in [23] by removing completeness from the requirements of both individual
and collective levels.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the
formal model of judgment aggregation with abstentions based on the formalisms
in [11, 24]. In section 3, we list the conditions that sound natural in the context
of abstentions and compare them with their counterparts in [19–21]. In Section
4, we propose a literal-based lexicographic judgment aggregation procedure and
investigate its properties. In the last section, we conclude the paper with a
discussion of further work.
2 The Model of Judgment Aggregation with Abstentions
We consider a finite set of individuals N = {1, 2, . . . , n} with |N | ≥ 2. They
are faced with a decision problem that requires group judgments on logically
interconnected propositions represented by a logical language L with a set Φ0 of
atomic propositions and logical connectives {¬,∨,∧,←,↔}. We assume that the
underlying logic of the logical language is the classical propositional logic with
standard syntax and semantics. The set of literals which are either propositional
variables or negations of propositional variables, is denoted by P , i.e., P =
{p,¬p | p ∈ Φ0}.
Given a decision-making problem, the set of propositions on which judgments
are to be made is called the agenda. Formally, the agenda is a finite non-empty
subset X ⊆ L that is closed under negation, i.e., if ϕ ∈ X , then ¬ϕ ∈ X , and
under propositional variables, i.e., for all ϕ ∈ L, if ϕ ∈ X , then for all p ∈ Φ0
occur in ϕ, p ∈ X . Let X0 = X ∩P be the set of literals included in the agenda.
Consider the doctrinal paradox in Introduction as an example. In that situation,
the agenda X is {p, q, p ∧ q,¬p,¬q,¬(p ∧ q)}, and the set X0 of literals in the
agenda is {p, q,¬p,¬q}. Similar to [18], we assume that double negations in the
agenda cancel each other. That is X = {ϕ,¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ X∗} where X∗ ⊆ L is a set
of unnegated propositions.
We represent each individual judgment set as a subset of the agenda, which
represents all the propositions that this individual accepts. The individual i ’s
judgment set is denoted by Φi, which is a subset of X . As we have mentioned
in the previous section, we will not assume that each individual’s judgment set
must be complete. For each proposition ϕ ∈ X , it may happen that ϕ ∈ Φi and
¬ϕ ∈ Φi. In this case, we say that individual i abstains from making a judgment
on ϕ, denoted by ϕ#Φi. In other words, ϕ#Φi if and only if ϕ ∈ Φi and ¬ϕ ∈ Φi.
We assume that each individual’s judgment satisfies the following conditions:
(Individual Logical Closure). For every ϕ ∈ X , if Φi |= ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Φi.
(Individual Consistency). For every ϕ ∈ X , if ϕ ∈ Φi, then ¬ϕ /∈ Φi.
The first condition requires that each individual judgment set is logically closed,
that is for any ϕ in the agenda, if it is a logical consequence of an individual
judgment set, then the individual accepts ϕ. The second condition specifies that
each individual judgment set must be logical consistence, i.e., an individual can-
not accept both ϕ and ¬ϕ for every proposition ϕ in the agenda. Given each
individual’s judgment set Φi, the vector (Φi)i∈N is called a profile. For instance,
the individual judgment set of each judge in the doctrinal paradox is as follows:
Φ1 = {p, q, p ∧ q}; Φ2 = {p,¬q,¬(p ∧ q)}; Φ3 = {¬p, q,¬(p ∧ q)}. They compose
a profile.
Finally, an (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to each ad-
missible profile (Φi)i∈N a single group judgment set Φ ⊆ X , where ϕ ∈ Φ means
that the group accepts ϕ. The set of admissible profiles is called the domain of
F , denoted as Dom(F ). Note that we do not require the group judgments to be
complete, which means that a group can also abstain from making a judgment
on a proposition.
3 Conditions on Aggregation Rules
We now turn to investigating the conditions which are desirable to be put on an
aggregation rule in terms of abstentions. Let F be an aggregation function. We
first consider the following three conditions:
Universal Domain (UD). The domain of F includes all logically closed and
consistent profiles (Φi)i∈N .
Collective Rationality (CR). For all ϕ ∈ X and for all (Φi)i∈N ∈ Dom(F )
F ((Φi)i∈N ) |= ϕ implies ϕ ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ), and ϕ ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ) implies ¬ϕ /∈
F ((Φi)i∈N ). This requires the collective judgment set is logical closed and
consistent.
Non-dictatorship (ND). There is no x ∈ N such that for all {Φi}i∈N ∈
Dom(F ), F ({Φi}i∈N) = Φx. This is a basic democratic requirement: no
single individual should always determine the group judgment set.
The next condition is the counterpart of Unanimity with Abstentions in [21]
which is restricted to literals.
Literal Unanimity with Abstentions (LU). For every α ∈ P, if there is
some V ⊆ N such that V = ∅, ∀i ∈ V.α ∈ Φi and ∀j ∈ N\V .α#Φj , then α ∈
F ((Φi)i∈N ). Intuitively, if a set of individuals agrees on a certain judgment
on a literal α while all the others abstain from α, then this condition requires
that F ((Φi)i∈N ) should accept α as well.
As we will see in the following example, this new condition plays a crucial role in
extending the agenda set from a set of literals to a set of logically interconnected
formulas without generating inconsistent aggregate results. On the other hand,
it is neither an extension nor a restriction of Unanimity without abstentions,
also called Pareto optimality in [20] and Paretian condition in [19], which is
described as follows:
For every ϕ ∈ X, if ϕ ∈ Φi for every i ∈ N , then ϕ ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ).
The following proposition says that non-dictatorship can be derived from LU.
Proposition 1. Every judgment aggregation rule satisfying literal unanimity
with abstentions is non-dictatorial.
Proof. Assume that F is dictatorial in some individual a ∈ N , then N/{a} = ∅.
Take α ∈ X0 and define α#Φa and α ∈ Φx for every x ∈ N/{a}. By literal una-
nimity with abstentions, α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ), then F ((Φi)i∈N ) = Φa, contradiction.
✷
The following independence condition requires that the group judgment on
each literal should depend only on individual judgments on that literal, which
is a counterpart of Arrow’s “independence of irrelevant alternative” [25]. With
abstentions, this condition has two different versions:
Strong Literal Independence (LIs). For every α ∈ P and every profiles
(Φi)i∈N , (Φ
′
i)i∈N ∈ Dom(F ), if α ∈ Φi ↔ α ∈ Φ
′
i for every i ∈ N , then
α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ) ↔ α ∈ F ((Φ′i)i∈N ).
Weak Literal Independence (LI). For every α ∈ P and every profiles
(Φi)i∈N , (Φ
′
i)i∈N ∈ Dom(F ), if α ∈ Φi ↔ α ∈ Φ
′
i and ¬α ∈ Φi ↔ ¬α ∈ Φ
′
i
for every i ∈ N , then α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ) ↔ α ∈ F ((Φ′i)i∈N ).
Note that these two versions are the same if we assume individual completeness.
However, once we allow abstentions, these two versions become different and the
strong version is intuitively too strong to be acceptable. Since in the profile even
if all judges who abstain on α turn to rejecting α, no matter how big portion of
these judges is, the strong version requires the group judgment on α to be the
same so long as the same set of judges accepts α. The weak version solves the
problem.
Similar conditions have been also discussed in the literature. It is not hard to
see that the strong (weak) literal Independence condition strengthens the inde-
pendence of irrelevant propositional alternatives condition in [23] to the set of
literals under the provision of abstentions, while the weak independence condi-
tion amounts to reserving the independent of irrelevant alternatives condition in
[19] to literals.
The following two conditions are two versions of the counterpart of the neu-
trality condition, which requires that literals should be treated in an even-handed
way by the aggregation function.
Strong Literal Neutrality (LNs). For every α, β ∈ P and every profile
(Φi)i∈N
∈ Dom(F ), if α ∈ Φi ↔ β ∈ Φi for every i ∈ N , then α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N )↔ β ∈
F ((Φi)i∈N ).
Weak Literal Neutrality (LN). For every α, β ∈ P and every profile (Φi)i∈N
∈ Dom(F ), if α ∈ Φi ↔ β ∈ Φi and ¬α ∈ Φi ↔ ¬β ∈ Φi for every i ∈ N ,
then α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N )↔ β ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ).
Similarly, these two versions are the same if we assume individual completeness,
and the strong version is intuitively too strong to be acceptable. Since in the
profile even if all judges who abstain on α reject β, no matter how big portion
of these judges is, the strong neutrality requires the group judgment on α and
β to be the same so long as the set of judges accepting α and the set of judges
accepting β are the same. The weak version solves the problem.
The last condition is the counterpart of Systematicity, introduced by List and
Pettit (2002), which combines independency and neutrality: literals should be
treated in an even-handed way by the aggregation function; the group judgment
on each literal should depend exclusively on the pattern of individual judgment
on that literal.
Strong Literal Systematicity (LSs). For every α, β ∈ P and every profiles
(Φi)i∈N , (Φ
′
i)i∈N ∈ Dom(F ), if for every i ∈ N , α ∈ Φi ↔ β ∈ Φ
′
i, then
α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N )↔ β ∈ F ((Φ′i)i∈N ).
Weak Literal Systematicity (LS). For every α, β ∈ P and every profiles
(Φi)i∈N , (Φ
′
i)i∈N ∈ Dom(F ), if for every i ∈ N , α ∈ Φi ↔ β ∈ Φ
′
i and
¬α ∈ Φi ↔ ¬β ∈ Φ
′
i, then α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N )↔ β ∈ F ((Φ
′
i)i∈N ).
The reason why we reserve Independence, Neutrality and Systematicity to
literals alone is based on the consideration that the problem of the doctrinal
paradox and the discursive dilemma in Introduction comes from the require-
ment that the majority rule treats the compound formulas and propositional
variables independently. Indeed the principle of compositionality, a fundamental
presupposition of the semantics in most contemporary logics, denotes that the
propositional variables are more primary than the compound formulas, since the
truth of the later is determined by the truth of the former. For instance, in doc-
trinal paradox, the truth of the conjunctive formula p ∧ q is determined by its
constituents p and q. In this sense, we may say the judgments on p and q are the
reasons to accept p∧ q or not, while the reason for whether p or q is accepted or
not is beyond the expressivity of propositional logic. Of course in more powerful
logic such as first-order logic, propositional variables are not primary atoms any
more. In that more refined logic, once it presupposes the principle of composi-
tionality, the new building blocks which replace propositional variables are the
reasons for accepting propositional variables or not.
In the light of this thought, we take a reason-based perspective and apply the
aggregation rule only to primary data whose reasons are beyond the expressiv-
ity power of the underlying logics, then use them to generate complex formulas
within the underlying logic [23, 26]. Under abstentions, it is the literals instead
of propositional variables that are primary data, since without completeness, we
can not derive that p is rejected from that p is not accepted. It may be possi-
ble that p is abstained (neither accepted nor rejected). Therefore, we amount
to reserving Independence, Neutrality and Systematicity to literals instead of
propositional variables, which makes them more acceptable. For instance, one
criticizes Systematicity (the independent part) being used for p∨ q, where p de-
notes “The government can afford a budget deficit”, and q “Forbidding smoking
should be legalized” on the ground that there are two propositions involved, and
that the society should know how each individual feels about either proposition,
and not just about their disjunction. There is no similar objection arising when
Systematicity applies to either p or q [23].
Another advantage is that this provides a plausible solution for the paradoxes
in Introduction. For instance, we may just apply the majority rule to literals
and calculate p, q in the group judgment set; then use them to generate p∧ q in
the group judgment set. According to this procedure, the group judgment set is
{p, q, p ∧ q} which is logically consistent.
In the following we denote Universal Domain, Collective Rationality, Literal
Unanimity with Abstentions and Weak Literal Systematicity as UD, CR, LU and
LS for short.
4 The Literal-Based Lexicographic Aggregation Rule
In this section, we improve the work [21] by proposing an aggregation rule for
judgment aggregation with abstentions under voters’ hierarchy that works well
over a set of logically interconnected formulas instead of a set of literals.
As we have mentioned in the introduction, we assume that there is a hierarchy
among all the individuals. In the real-world we can easily see such a hierarchy,
for instance, the management structure of an enterprise, a democratic politi-
cal regime or a community organisation. Members in different ranks may play
different roles in collective decision-making.
Definition 1. A hierarchy over the set N of individuals is a strict partial order
< over N that satisfies transitivity and asymmetry.
It follows that there is no infinite ascending sequence i1 < i2 < i3 < · · · , where
in ∈ N , which means all hierarchical chains of N must be “up-bounded” with
at least one top leader. In this sense, we say (N,<) is well-prioritized.
An aggregation rule determines which propositions are collectively accepted
and which ones are collectively rejected. As we denoted, X0 = X∩P is the set of
literals included in the agenda. We first define an aggregate procedure F for that
a literal α ∈ X0 is collectively accepted, denoted by α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ), as follows:
Definition 2. For every α ∈ X0,
α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ) iff ∀i ∈ N(¬α /∈ Φi∨∃j ∈ N(i < j∧α ∈ Φj)) and ∃k ∈ N.α ∈ Φk
(1)
Intuitively, this aggregate procedure says that a literal α is accepted by a
group if the following two conditions are both satisfied.
(1) for any individual if he rejects α, then there is an individual with higher
hierarchy accepting α; and
(2) there is at least one individual accepting α.
We denote the set of collectively accepted literals by F ((Φi)i∈N )0. Based on this
concept, we define that any ϕ ∈ X is collectively accepted as follows:
Definition 3. For any ϕ ∈ X,
ϕ ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ) iff F ((Φi)i∈N )0 |= ϕ (2)
This definition says that a proposition ϕ in the agenda X is collectively accepted
if it is a logical consequence of the set of collectively accepted literals.
Similarly, a proposition ϕ ∈ X is collectively abstained if neither itself nor its
negation is collectively accepted. That is,
ϕ#F ((Φi)i∈N ) iff ϕ /∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ) and ¬ϕ /∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ). (3)
We call above defined judgment aggregation rule F the literal-based lexico-
graphic rule since we just apply the lexicographic rule to the subset of literals
in the agenda.
To demonstrate how this rule works, let us consider the following example.
Example 1. Suppose Ann, Bill and Tom have to make group judgments on three
logically connected propositions as follows:
p: There is the elixir of life.
q: People can be immortal.
p→ q: If there is the elixir of life, then people can be immortal.
Ann thinks p is true and abstains on q and p → q, Bill rejects q and abstains
on p and p→ q, Tom accepts q and p→ q, and abstains on p. Their individual
judgments are shown as follows:
Table 3.
p q p→q
Ann T # #
Bill # F #
Tom # T T




Note that individuals with the highest priority are written at the top of the dia-
gram. We next apply the literal-based aggregation rule to generate the collective
judgment set. The model of this aggregation situation is as follows:
– N = {Ann,Bill, T om} with Ann< Bill and Tom< Bill;
– X = {p, q, p→ q,¬p,¬q,¬(p→ q)} and X0 = {p, q,¬p,¬q}.
The individual judgment sets for Ann, Bill and Tom are as follows:
• p ∈ ΦAnn, q#ΦAnn, p→ q#ΦAnn;
• p#ΦBill, ¬q ∈ ΦBill, p→ q#ΦBill;
• p#ΦTom, q ∈ ΦTom, p→ q ∈ ΦTom.
We first calculate the group judgments on the set X0 of literals by Definition 2.
– The collective accepts p, since all of them don’t reject p, i.e., ∀i ∈ N(¬p /∈ Φi)
holds, and Ann accepts p, i.e., ∃j ∈ N(p ∈ Φj) holds.
– The collective rejects q, since Bill with the highest priority rejects q, even
though Tom accepts q.
Then the collective accepts p and rejects q, i.e., F ((Φi)i∈N )0 = {p,¬q}. And by
Definition 3, the collective rejects (p → q), since {p,¬q} |= ¬(p → q). Thus,
the group judgment set is {p,¬q,¬(p → q)} by the literal-based lexicographic
aggregation rule.
We would like to remind that the quasi-lexicographic rule in [21] fails to deal
with this situation, since the agenda involves logically interconnected formula
p→ q. If we apply that rule to this agenda, we could get an inconsistent aggregate
result {p,¬q, p→ q}.
Moreover, the literal-based lexicographic aggregation rule provides a plausible
solution to the paradox in Introduction. Let’s consider the discursive dilemma.
We may take all the possible hierarchy among the three agents into consideration.
One boss case: let 1 < 2 < 3 be the hierarchy, then according to this rule the
aggregate result is just the individual aggregate set of the first agent {p, q, p→
q}, which is consistent. Yet the cost of this case is that the first agent seems to
be the dictator for this profile, which is a bit depressing. Two-boss case: let the
priority order be 1 < 3 and 1 < 2, then in the virtue of this rule, they collectively
reject q and abstain on p and p → q. Three-boss (no boss or anonymity) case:
according to this rule, p, q and p→ q are all collectively abstained.
We next investigate the properties of the literal-based lexicographic rule F .
The first proposition shows that the literal-based lexicographic rule F satisfies
above desirable conditions UD, CR, LU and LS.
Theorem 1. The literal-based lexicographic rule F satisfies conditions UD, CR,
LU and LS.
Proof. It is straightforward that F satisfies conditions UD according to the def-
inition.
We next show F satisfies CR.
(Logical Closure) For any ϕ ∈ X and for all {Φi}i∈N , assume F ({Φi}i∈N ) |= ϕ.
Since F ({Φi}i∈N )0 |= F ({Φi}i∈N) (F ({Φi}i∈N )0 |= ψ for any ψ ∈ F ({Φi}i∈N )),
so F ({Φi}i∈N)0 |= ϕ, so ϕ ∈ F ({Φi}i∈N ) by Definition 3.
(Consistence) We first show for any α ∈ P , α ∈ F ({Φi}i∈N )0 implies ¬α ∈
F ({Φi}i∈N)0. Suppose for a contradiction that for some β ∈ P , β ∈ F ({Φi}i∈N)0
and ¬β ∈ F ({Φi}i∈N)0, then (i) ∀i ∈ N(¬β /∈ Φi ∨ ∃j ∈ N(i < j ∧ β ∈ Φj))
and ∃k ∈ N.β ∈ Φk; (ii) ∀i ∈ N(β /∈ Φi ∨ ∃j ∈ N(i < j ∧ ¬β ∈ Φj)) and ∃k ∈
N.¬β ∈ Φk. By (i), (ii) we can get an infinite ascending sequence i1, i2, i3, · · · ,
which is a contradiction with that (N,<) is well-prioritized. Then F ({Φi}i∈N)0
is consistent, so by the Definition 3, F ({Φi}i∈N ) is consistent as well.
For LU, assume for every α ∈ P , if there is some V ⊆ N such that V = ∅,
∀i ∈ V.α ∈ Φi and ∀j ∈ N\V .α#Φj , then by Definition 2, α ∈ F ({Φi}i∈N ).
For LS, given every α ∈ P , the individuals accepting α and these rejecting α
are the same for every two profiles (Φi)i∈N , (Φ
′
i)i∈N , then the aggregate results
of α according to the Definition 2 are the same as well. Yet it is not the case for
LSs, for we could construct a counterexample: given a hierarchy on an agent set
N = {1, 2, 3} with 1 < 2, 1 < 3. For the profile (Φi)i∈N where α ∈ Φ1, α#Φ2
and α#Φ3, we have α ∈ F (Φi)i∈N by LU . Let individual 2, 3 who abstain on it
turn to rejecting α, while individual 1 still accepts α, we get a different profile
(Φ′i)i∈N , where α ∈ Φ
′
1, ¬α ∈ Φ
′
2 and ¬α ∈ Φ
′
3, but α /∈ F (Φ
′
i)i∈N . ✷
As we expected, F satisfies the four desirable conditions and thus is a feasible ag-
gregation rule for hierarchical groups to generate group judgments. One may be
surprised to find that as an ‘unfair’ aggregationrule,F is non-dictatorial by Propo-
sition 1. On the other hand, this shows that non-dictatorship is a very weak con-
dition imposed on judgment aggregation functions when abstention is allowable.
Ga¨rdenfors and Dietrich et al have both showed that by giving up complete-
ness, oligarchies instead of dictatorships are obtained [18, 20]. We investigate
whether this proposed rule is oligarchic. The definition of an oligarchic rule is
given as follows:
Definition 4. An aggregation rule G satisfying UD is a weak oligarchy if there
is a non-empty smallest subset M ⊆ N such that for every profile (Φi)i∈N ∈
Dom(G), ⋂
i∈M
Φi ⊆ G((Φi)i∈N ).
And an oligarchic rule G is strict if for every profile (Φi)i∈N ∈ Dom(G),
⋂
i∈M
Φi = G((Φi)i∈N ).
In this case, we call G to be weakly (strictly) oligarchic with respect to M.
That is, an aggregation rule satisfying universal domain is said to be weakly
oligarchic if there is a non-empty smallest set M such that for any profile of
individual judgment set, the group judgment set contains all the propositions if
they are in every member’s judgment set of M . Furthermore, we say an aggre-
gation rule is strictly oligarchic if for any profile of individual judgment set, the
group judgment set is exactly the set of propositions that are in every member’s
judgment set of M . Special cases of weak oligarchic aggregation rules are unan-
imous (M = N), majority (|M | > n2 ) and dictatorial (M = {i}) rules. Specifi-
cally, the unanimous and dictatorial rules are weakly and strictly oligarchic rules,
majority rule is weakly but not strictly oligarchic. However, the literal-based lex-
icographic rule F is neither weakly oligarchic nor strictly oligarchic. Here is a
simple counter-example.
Let the agent set N = {1, 2} with <= ∅ , the agenda X = {p, q, p →
q,¬p,¬q,¬(p → q)} and the set of literals in the agenda X0 = {p, q,¬p,¬q},
the individual judgment set for each agent is as follows: Φ1 = {p, q, p → q},
Φ2 = {¬p,¬q, p → q}. Then Φ1 ∩ Φ2 = {p → q}, but according to the literal-
based aggregation rule F , p#F (Φ1, Φ2), q#F (Φ1, Φ2) and p → q#F (Φ1, Φ2).
Thus, Φ1 ∩ Φ2 ⊆ F (Φ1, Φ2).
It may be a bit surprising to find that the literal-based aggregation rule is
not oligarchic. In fact this does not violates the results in [18, 20] since their
conditions imposed on the aggregation rules are more strengthened than ours.
Specifically, the unanimity and systemacity conditions hold for all formulas while
we restrict them to literals. On the other hand, our proposed rule is literal-
based, and the compound formulas are dependent on the collective judgments
on the literals instead of generating by this rule. That is, if a formula is a logical
consequence of the collective literals, then it is in the collective set; otherwise,
it is abstained. Therefore, Instead of the whole agenda, we need to consider the
oligarchy notion with respect to the set of literals in the agenda on which the
literal-based aggregation rule takes effect. This idea leads to a weak concept of
an oligarchic aggregation rule as follows:
Definition 5. An aggregation rule G satisfying UD is a weak oligarchy w.r.t
X0 if there is a non-empty smallest subset M ⊆ N such that for every profile
(Φi)i∈N ∈ Dom(G),
{ϕ ∈ X |
⋂
i∈M
Φi ∩X0 |= ϕ} ⊆ G((Φi)i∈N ).
And an oligarchic rule G is strict w.r.t X0 if for every profile (Φi)i∈N ∈ Dom(G),
{ϕ ∈ X |
⋂
i∈M
Φi ∩X0 |= ϕ} = G((Φi)i∈N ).
Intuitively, an aggregation rule satisfying universal domain is said to be weakly
oligarchic w.r.t X0 if there is a non-empty smallest set M such that for any
profile of individual judgment set, the group judgment set contains all the con-
sequences of literals that are in every member’s judgment set of M . Similarly,
an aggregation rule is strictly oligarchic w.r.t X0 if for any profile of individual
judgment set, the group judgment set is exactly the set of consequences of the
literals that are in every member’s judgment set of M .
We have the following proposition saying the literal-based lexicographic rule
F is weakly oligarchic w.r.t X0, but not strictly oligarchic w.r.t X0.
Proposition 2. The literal-based lexicographic rule F is weakly oligarchic w.r.t
X0, but not strictly oligarchic w.r.t X0.
Proof. Suppose F satisfies universal domain, it suffices to find a non-empty
smallest set M ⊆ N , such that for every profile of individual judgment sets
(Φi)i∈N , every ϕ ∈ X , if
⋂
i∈M Φi ∩ X0 |= ϕ, then ϕ ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ). Let O =
Max≥(N) = {i ∈ N : ∄j ∈ N.i < j}. Since (N,<) is well-prioritized and |N | ≥
2, so O must exist and be non-empty. Suppose for every profile of individual
judgment sets (Φi)i∈N , every i ∈ N and for all α ∈ X0, if α ∈
⋂
i∈O Φi, then
according to Definition 2, α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ). Then
⋂
i∈O Φi ∩ X0 ⊆ F ((Φi)i∈N )0.
Since
⋂
i∈O Φi∩X0 |= ϕ, so F ((Φi)i∈N )0 |= ϕ, so ϕ ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ) by Definition 3.
We next show O is the smallest one with {ϕ ∈ X |
⋂
i∈O Φi ∩ X0 |= ϕ} ⊆
F ((Φi)i∈N ). Suppose not, then there is some A ⊆ N such that A ⊂ O and
{ϕ ∈ X |
⋂
i∈A Φi ∩X0 |= ϕ} ⊆ F ((Φi)i∈N ), then there is some a ∈ N such that
a ∈ O but a /∈ A. Take some β ∈ X0 and define β ∈ Φi for every i ∈ N\{a} and
¬β ∈ Φa, then by Definition 2, β /∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ), but β ∈ {ϕ ∈ X |
⋂
i∈A Φi ∩
X0 |= ϕ}, contradicting with assumption. Thus, O is just the required M.
It’s easy to construct a profile such that
⋂
i∈M Φi ∩X0 ⊇ F ((Φi)i∈N ) by LU.
Take α ∈ X0 and define α#Φa for some a ∈M and α ∈ Φx for every x ∈ N/{a}.
By literal unanimity with abstentions, α ∈ F ((Φi)i∈N ), but α ∈
⋂
i∈M Φi ∩X0.
Thus F is not strictly oligarchic w.r.t X0. ✷
On the one hand the literal-based lexicographic aggregation rule F satisfies all
the desirable conditions given in Section 3; on the other hand, it is only oligarchic
with respect to the subset of literals in the agenda not over the whole set of
agenda due to its literal-base characteristics.
The last proposition of this section shows under which conditions two literal-
based lexicographic rules are identical. We first introduce a helpful notation. For
any i ∈ N and any ϕ, ψ ∈ X , the individual i makes the same judgment on ϕ
and ψ is denoted by Φi|{ϕ} ⇔ Φi|{ψ}, that is Φi|{ϕ} ⇔ Φi|{ψ} is equivalent to
(ϕ ∈ Φi iff ψ ∈ Φi) and (¬ϕ ∈ Φi iff ¬ψ ∈ Φi).
Proposition 3. Let {p} ⊆ X ∩ Φ0, and f1, f2 be two literal-based lexicographic
rules. If for all profiles of individual judgment sets (Φi)i∈N , f1((Φi)i∈N )|{p}
⇔f2((Φi)i∈N )|{p}, then for all ϕ ∈ X, f1((Φi)i∈N )|{ϕ} ⇔ f2((Φi)i∈N )|{ϕ}.
Proof. Take any q ∈ X ∩ Φ0. Define the profile (Φ′i)i∈N in terms of (Φi)i∈N as
follows: for all i ∈ N , Φ′i = Φi except at p where Φ
′
i|{p} ⇔ Φi|{q}. Then
f1((Φi)i∈N )|{q} ⇔ f1((Φi|{q})i∈N ) by LI
⇔ f1((Φ′i|{p})i∈N ) by LS
⇔ f1((Φ′i)i∈N )|{p} by LI
⇔ f2((Φ′i)i∈N )|{p} by hypothesis
⇔ f2((Φ′i|{p})i∈N ) by LI
⇔ f2((Φi|{q})i∈N ) by LS
⇔ f2((Φi)i∈N )|{q} by LI.
It is clear that f1((Φi)i∈N ) ∩ Φ0 = f2((Φi)i∈N ) ∩ Φ0.
Hence, f1((Φi)i∈N ) = f2((Φi)i∈N ). ✷
This proposition says that if two literal-based lexicographic rules make a same
judgment (acceptance, rejection and abstention) on a propositional variable in
the agenda, then they make the same judgment on all the formulas in the agenda.
In the other word, a literal-based lexicographic rule is determined by its responses
to all the possible judgments (acceptance, rejection and abstention) on a fixed
propositional variable in the agenda. This property paves the way to show a
characterization result of the literal-based lexicographic rule. We leave this work
for future.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a literal-based lexicographic rule which extends
the set of agenda from a set of literals to a set of logically interconnected for-
mulas [21] and further investigated the properties of this rule. It turns out that
this proposed rule is neither dictatorial nor oligarchic in the standard sense. The
reason for non-dictatorship is that, as proved in Proposition 1, we may take ad-
vantage of the abstention to show all individuals fail to play a role in collective
decision-making on a particular proposition when they abstain from that propo-
sition. This indicates that under the provision of abstentions, non-dictatorship
is a rather weak condition imposed on the judgment aggregation rule. The rea-
son for non-oligarchy is due to its literal-based characteristics. In fact, we may
regard this proposed rule as a special case of premiss-based rule [27] where the
set of premisses is the subset of literals in the agenda.
There are many directions for future investigations. Firstly, as a special kind
of lexicographic rule, it is interesting to investigate a representation result for our
proposed aggregation rule. The lexicographic rule has been extensively studies
in preference aggregation, and [28] has proved that lexicographic rule is the only
way of combining preference relations satisfying five natural conditions which are
very close to Arrow’s conditions. We expect to obtain a similar characterization
result for our proposed rule. This work is under way;
Secondly, under the provision of abstentions, we have amended the commonly
desirable conditions. It is natural to investigate some possibility results with
respect to these amending conditions. In terms of the rationality requirements,
this means that we drop the completeness condition. Comparing with the im-
possibility results, we get a possibility result which can be stated as: there are
non-dictatorial aggregation rules satisfying universal domain, collective rational-
ity, literal unanimity with abstentions and weak literal systematicity, which seems
positive news to the result in [23]. However, it is not the case since we do not
assume completeness at both individual and collective levels, which means that
a judge can abstain from a proposition and the group judgment on a proposition
can be undetermined.
In addition, with abstentions, the dictatorship in judgment aggregation can
also vary in degrees [29]. It is highly interesting to investigate the possibility
scope between rationality, dictatorship under a set of plausible conditions. Some
work has been done in this direction [30].
Last but not least, since the universal and perfect aggregation rule does not ex-
ist, a plausible way is to boil down aggregation problems to three-sided matching
questions between specific so-called degenerate rules, specific groups and specific
agendas., which is a promising direction [22].
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